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IMMIGRATION LEGISLATION PURSUANT TO
THREATS TO US NATIONAL SECURITY
Ruchir Patel*
This article will examine the United States' immigration legislation in the
face of threats to national security Throughout history foreign enemies have
threatened the American way of life, from the Germans in World War I, to the
spread of Communism, to the current threat of terrorism. As history has
demonstrated, the U.S. has taken drastic measures to protect its citizens. This
paper will consider those actions and evaluate the PATRIOT Act's adequacy in
resolving the present threat to national security Further, this paper will propose
reforms to certain immigration provisions of the PATRIOT Act.
BACKGROUND

The United States Constitution grants Congress the power to "establish a
uniform Rule of Naturalization"' and grants the Executive Branch the inherent
sovereign authority to regulate immigration.2 Aliens seeking entrance into the
United States have no claim of right; 3 rather admission is a privilege granted by the
sovereign nation upon such terms as it prescribes.
The United States relies upon immigration policies to protect itself against
subversives. 5 U.S. history includes spies, saboteurs, anarchists, and terrorists as
parts of this subversive class. It has feared immigrants who
seek to destroy the
6
government rather than strive for the shelter of its freedoms.
J.D. Candidate, Georgetown University Law Center, May 2004; B.S., Rutgers College of Pharmacy,
May 2001. Many thanks to my parents, Vipm & Jayshree Patel, my sister, Jinita Patel, and her family,
and to my better half, Tejal Joshi, for their perpetual support and understanding.
1. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
2. Excludable Aliens, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(27)(2001) (Grants the Attorney General the power to
exclude any alien seeking admission into the United States "to engage in activities which would be
prejudicial to the public interest or endanger the welfare, safety, or security of the United States.")
3. U.S. ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950); Accord Landon v. Plasencia,

459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982).
4. Id.
5. See generally Alexander Wohl, Comment, Free Speech and the Right of Entry Into the United
States: Legislation to Remedy the Ideological Exclusion Provisions of the Immigration and
Naturalization Act, 4 AM. U. J. INT'L. L. & POL'Y. 443, 447-459 (1989) (Increasing numbers of
immigrants coupled with international unrest during the World War I, World War 11,and Cold War
Eras, led the United States government to enact stringent immigration policies in an attempt to ward off
perceived threats to national security).
6. See generally JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN
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The protective immigration policies that the United States has legislated and
implemented have been in response to fear, whether it is in response to a physical
attack on the country, or an attack on its culture, political beliefs, or freedoms.
When immigrants threaten the American way of life, Americans respond by
uniting and displaying a strong sense of nativism. 8 Nativism is a concept deeply
rooted in American history, dating as far back as the late 1830's. 9 Nativism is
defined as an intense opposition to a specific minority on the ground of its foreign
("un-American") connections. I° Nativism was the energizing force behind the
Nativistic activities were evidenced
modem day theory of nationalism."i
throughout U.S. history resulting in immigration12reform during World War I,
World War II, and against the fear of Communism.
HISTORICAL LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE

World War I
During World War I, there was an increased concern over subversives and
radical aliens, and legislation against those persons was strengthened.13 Dissident
immigrants were imprisoned for their anti-war campaigns. 14 Under wartime
conditions, Congress passed the so-called Anarchists Act of October 16, 1918,
which ordered the deportation of alien anarchists residing within the United States
and made it a felony punishable by imprisonment for those deported to reenter or
attempt to reenter the country '5This Act was amended by the June 5, 1920 Act
which included in the anarchist class aliens who advocate "the unlawful damage,
injury or destruction of property, or sabotage."' 16 As an effect of the war and the
wartime legislation, there was anti-German sentiment pervading throughout the
United States. 17 The Justice Department gathered German aliens into internment
camps under the President's summary powers.Is The total number of arrested
aliens rose from 1200 to 6300 by the end of 1918.19 Further, the regulations
governing the remaining Germans were tightened, requiring them to register and
NATIVISM 1860-1925, (Atheneum 1963).
7. See David Cole, Terrorizing Immigrants in the Name of Fighting Terrorism, 29 HUM. RTS. I I
(Winter 2002).
8. See Wohl, supra note 5.
9. JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM 1860-1925
(1963).
10. Id.at4.
ll. Id.
12. See Cole, supra note 7, at1I.
13. See Wohl, supra note 5, at 449.
14. Cole, supra note 7, at 11.
15. E.P HUTCHINSON, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY 424, 17981965 (U. Penn. Press 1981).
16. Id. at 424 (quoting Act of June 5, 1920, 41 Stat. 1008).
17 HIGHAM, supra note 9, at 196-98.
18. Id.at210.
19. Id.
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"forbidding them to move without official permission."

The climate of repression established during World War I continued against
Communists even after the conclusion of the war.2' In 1919 the U.S. government
responded to a politically motivated bombing of Attorney General Palmer's home
by rounding up alien members of the two communist parties.22 Approximately
three23thousand aliens were held for deportation in response to this threat on the
u.s.
World War I1
Another example of the U.S. government taking action against potentially
threatening immigrants occurred during World War 11.24 The approach of the war
gave a strong impetus to establish a system for alien registration .2 The Alien
Registration Act of 1940 dealt with subversion and deportation for numerous
offenses as well as registration requirements, including fingerprinting of an alien in
advance of issuance of a U.S. visa.26
In addition to the Alien Registration Act of 1940, the federal government
interned over 110,000 persons, mostly Japanese immigrants. 27 In an executive
order delivered on February 19 1942, President Roosevelt authorized the
internment of persons who may have posed a threat to national security or the war
effort.28 This order came as part of a response following an attack on the U.S. by
Japanese forces.29
Communism
Following World War I1,
the continued fight against Communism reached its
peak in the McCarthy Era. 30 This anti-communist sentiment led to the passage of
the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952, which introduced an ideological criterion for
admission: immigrants and visitors to the U.S. could be denied entry on the basis
of their political ideology (e.g., if they were communists). 31 This Act expanded the
definition of the subversive classes that were subject to exclusion and
20. Id.
21. See Wohl, supra note 5, at 450.
22. Id.at230; See also Cole, supra note 7.
23. HIGHAM, supra note 9, at 231.
24. See Cole, supra note 7; See Wohl, supra, note 5, at 45 1.
25. HUTCHINSON, supra note 165, at 541.
26. Id., See also Alien Registration Act, 1940, ch. 439, 54 Stat. 670, tit. III repealed by Pub. L.
No. 414, § 403, 66 Stat. 279, 280.
27 Cole, supra note 7
28. Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942) [hereinafter Executive Order].
29. The order came following the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, which resulted in the
death of over 1,000 U.S. soldiers.
30. See Wohl, supra note 5, at 451.
31. See Immigration and Nationality (McCarran-Walter) Act, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163, 184-186
(1952) [hereinafter McCarran-Walter Act] (regulating the exclusion and deportation of non-citizens
who advocated communism or other proscribed beliefs).
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deportation. 32 In essence, it became against national33policy to be a member of the
Communist Party and to advocate proscribed beliefs.
Present Day Threat: Terrorism
Such examples demonstrate that U.S. historical immigration actions were
often in response to a perceived or actual threat by immigrants. 34 Present day
immigration legislation stems not from war, or fear of Communism, but from
terrorism, one of the threats included in the class of subversives.35 Terrorism is
defined as "the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to
intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof,
in furtherance of political or social objectives. On September 1I, 2001, terrorists
attacked the United States and killed over 6000 people. Nineteen terrorists
hijacked four commercial airlines in the U.S., and used them as bombs by flying
two planes into the World Trade Centers, one into the Pentagon, and the fourth
crashing into Pennsylvania.36 All nineteen hijackers were foreigners, and at least
sixteen entered the U.S. through ports of entry, with a tourist or student visa; some
of those visas having expired before September 11, 200 1.
September 11, 2001 highlighted the frightening reality of terrorist threats and
the gross inadequacy of the then current immigration system.38 Though September
11th was the most devastating attack on US soil by a terrorist attack, it was not the
first. 39 The U.S. government had prior knowledge and exposure to terrorist attacks
as evidenced during the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, and the nerve gas attack on
the Tokyo subway system.4 0 These events raised concern and placed increased
pressure for government action. Congress responded by legislating the 1996
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, which provided for new definitions
and enhanced penalties for terrorist crimes.41 Congress further enacted the
Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 to address threats of
biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. 42 After these base programs were
established, the focus was on "refining terrorism preparedness. 43 Reports

32. HUTCHINSON, supra note 15, at 311.
33. See McCarran-Walter Act, supra note 31.
34. See Wohl, supra note 5, at 451.
35. Cole, supra note 7
36. Philip Martin & Susan Martin, Immigration and Terrorism: Policy Reform Challenges, 8
Migration News 10 1 (2001), at http://www.migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/more.php?id=2462_0 2_0.

37. Id.at 2.
38. Id. at 6.
39. See PHILIP B. HEYMANN, TERRORISM AND AMERICA: A COMMON SENSE STRATEGY FOR A
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 1-2 (MIT Press 2000).
40. Id.
41. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214 (1996); see generally H.R. CONF REP NO. 104-518 (1996).
42. See Pub. L. No. 104-201, § 1401, 110 Stat. 2422, 2714 (1996); see generally H.R. CONF
REP NO. 104-724 at 824-29 (1996).
43. Michael T McCarthy, Recent Development: USA Patriot Act, 39 HARV J. ON LEGis. 435,
437 (Summer 2002).
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indicated that the federal agencies' approach to combating terrorism was
fragmented with very little coordination and cooperation." Further exacerbating
the problem was the fact that the intelligence community and law enforcement had
inadequate resources to gather intelligence, infiltrate terrorist groups, and prevent
attacks. 5 These reports led Congress to hold hearings on how to rectify the
situation, but increased concerns over civil liberties issues resulted in little action.46
Therefore, prior to September I VIhthe problems with the immigration system
concerning terrorism were realized but there was no implementation to directly
address them. 7
The September II th attacks became the catalyst in turning those abstract flaws
in "terrorism preparedness" into stringent regulations. The attacks highlighted a
major problem in the system of intelligence sharing between the intelligence
agencies and law enforcement. These problems ultimately led to the inability of
the Intelligence Community to prevent the September 1Ith attacks. 48 Two of the
September I I1h terrorists were affiliated with AI-Qaeda, and were under
surveillance prior to 9/11 by the CIA. 49 The NSA also independently had
knowledge of the terrorists' connections to AI-Qaeda.50 Despite this critical
information, the CIA did not report these findings to watch list databases, such as
TIPOFF 51 nor did it directly notify the FBI or the INS in time to prevent their
entry into the United States. 2 Coupled with this was the FBI's inability to obtain53a
search warrant for the computer of accused 54terrorist Habib Zacarius Massaoui
who was known to be a member of al-Qaeda.

44. Id.
45. See generally

ADVISORY

PANEL TO ASSESS

DOMESTIC

RESPONSE

CAPABILITIES

FOR

TERRORISM INVOLVING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, First Annual Report to the President and

the Congress (Dec. 15, 1999) and Second Annual Report to the President and Congress (Dec. 14,
2000), available at http://www.rand.orglnsrd/terrpanel/; see also National Commission on Terrorism,
Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism, available at http://www.access.gpo.gov/
nct/index.htmi.
46. Jake Tapper, Don't Blame It On Reno, Jan. 2, 2002, at 2-3, at http://archive.salon.com/
politics/feature/2002/01/02/renoindexnp.html.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. September I Ith and the Imperative of Reform in the U.S. Intelligence Community, (Dec. 10,
2002) (additional views of Senator Richard C. Shelby, Vice Chairman, Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence), available at http://intelligence.senate.gov/shelby.pdf [hereinafter Shelby].
50. Id. at 26.
51. Id. at 25. (The TIPOFF program was instituted for the purpose of using biographic
information drawn from intelligence products for watch-listing purposes. In August 2002, the entire
TIPOFF database was made available to authorized users from the Intelligence Community and law
enforcement agencies. TIPOFF contains names of suspected terrorists who are either members of
foreign terrorist organizations, known hijackers, car-bombers, assassins, or hostage-takers. Currently,
efforts are under way to transform the TIPOFF watch-list into National Watch-list Center).
52. McCarthy, supra note 43, at 438.
53. James V Grimaldi, With Perfect Hindsight, Some Question Decision Not to Seek Surveillance
of Curious Flight Student, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 2001, at E13. [Moussaoui was detained by the FBI in
Aug. of 2001 after his enrollment in flight school and asking for lessons on a 747 simulator on how to
only fly horizontally, with no interest in takeoffs or landings].
54. World News Tonight: FBI missed significance of Habib Moussaoui askingfor flying lessons in
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The connection between these events is that both could have been prevented if
the various intelligence agencies coordinated their actions and shared their
respective information.
USA PATRIOT ACT
Intelligence
Current Problem of Information Sharing
The General Accounting Office (GAO) of the federal government recently
assessed the "information sharing within and between federal, state and local
agencies,
and concluded that there existed tremendous communication
problems. 5 5 The GAO reported that each agency (FBI, CIA, NSA, and the other
intelligence agencies) had a distinct organizational culture, and there have
historically been walls separating their co-existence. 56 Further, the GAO identified
three principal problems that the agencies must resolve if they are to succeed in
their war against terrorism: fragmentation, technological impediments, and
ineffective collaboration."
All three of these are illustrated in one specific
example: the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) had information on a reputed
terrorist, but due to the technological impediments and the inability to collaborate,
this information was not directly shared with the Intelligence Community 58
The U.S.'s primary response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks has been the Uniting
and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT ACT). 5 9 The Act was signed
into law on October 26, 2001, and substantive provisions of the Act focus on
intelligence gathering, intelligence sharing, and strengthening immigration
enforcement against suspected terrorists.60
Surveillance
As a result of this lack of investigative information collaboration, the USA
747flight simulator (ABC News broadcast, Sept. 15, 2001 ).
55. Counter Terrorism Information Sharing With Other Federal Agencies and With State and
Local Governments and the PrivateSector 20 (Oct. I, 2002) (reported by Eleanor Hill, Staff Director,
Joint Inquiry Staff), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/202_hr/10102hill.html [hereinafter

Hill].
56. Id. (specifically identifies legal walls, classification walls, and bureaucratic walls existing
between the agencies).

57. Id. (Success is defined as national, state, and local governments working collaboratively with
each other and with the federal intelligence agencies).
58. Id.(Terrorist bomber Ahmed Ressam had been arrested while trying to enter the U.S. from
Canada with intentions of bombing Los Angeles International Airport).
59. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
60. Id. at 1005.
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PATRIOT Act included provisions to revise the law enforcement/Intelligence
Community coordination. 6' The first step was to expand the government's ability
63
to conduct surveillance 62 by authorizing wiretaps for surveillance. It also granted
authority for the expansion of roving wiretaps" under the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA). 65 The PATRIOT Act made amendments to the
FSIA making it more effective in terrorist investigations by granting authority for
pen registers, trap and trace devices. 66 This permitted the government to employ
surveillance technology that could monitor email, and other types of Internet
communications. 67 Additionally, the PATRIOT Act amended the FSIA by
replacing "purpose" with "significant purpose" thereby allowing law enforcement
officers to obtain FISA warrants for gathering intelligence with the intent of using
it for criminal matters.68
Information Sharing
The second part of the intelligence provisions deal with the sharing of this
gathered information within the Intelligence Committee and with the Immigration
Sections 203 and 905 will aid the Intelligence
Enforcement Agencies.69
70
Community and law enforcement in their cooperative efforts to combat terrorism.
Prior to the PATRIOT Act, a prosecutor was precluded from disclosing to law
enforcement, intelligence officers, or any other official any information from
federal grand jury proceedings, electronic, wire and oral communications that were
intercepted.7 The PATRIOT Act established guidelines permitting and even at
Community 72
times requiring the sharing of this information with the Intelligence
61. Shelby, supra note 49, at 53.
62. See USA Patriot Act, supra note 59.
63. Id. at § 201. (Congress limited these wiretaps under Title Ill to only antiterrorist activity).
64. Id. at § 206. (A roving wiretap enables government officers to monitor suspected terrorist's
communications regardless of his location at time of communication).
65. Id (FSIA was implemented in response to increasing national security threats from abroad, it
broadened the executive branch's Title III search and seizure powers to foreign enemies); see also Mike
Dowley, Note, Government Surveillance Powers Under the USA PATRIOT Act: Is It Possible to
ProtectNational Security and Privacy at the Same Time? A Constitutional Tug-of-War 36 SUFFOLK U.
L. REV. 165, 173 (2002).
66. USA Patriot Act, supra note 59, at § 214; McCarthy, supra note 43, at 445. (Pen registers and
trap and trace devices can record the time, date, and telephone numbers of outgoing and incoming
calls).
67 USA Patriot Act, supra note 59, at § 214; Dowley, supra note 65, at 178.
68. USA Patriot Act, supra note 59, at § 218; McCarthy, supra note 43, at 444.
69. See USA Patriot Act, supra note 59
70. Id. at §§ 203, 905.
71. Press Release, Department of Justice, Attorney General Announces New Guidelines to Share
Information Between Federal Law Enforcement and the U.S. Intelligence Community (Sept. 23, 2002),
availableat www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2002/September/02_ag_541 .htm (Prosecutors were not permitted to
disclose this information even if it indicated plan for future terrorist attack).
72. USA Patriot Act, supra note 59, at § 203(b)(d) (modifies grand jury secrecy roles of the Fed.
R. Crim. P 6(e)(3)(c)). (These provisions enable the FBI, CIA, and other intelligence agencies to share
information related to terrorism freely, and without regard to where and how the information was
gathered); see also McCarthy, supra note 43, at 442. The required sharing of information is predicated
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This legislation has taken a leap towards dismantling the "walls" between the
intelligence agencies. Through communication and cooperation, information
sharing will lead to higher success rates of infiltrating terrorist organizations,
apprehending suspected terrorists, and preventing future attacks.
Civil Liberties Concerns
The Constitution provides the government with the necessary powers to
protect the country from significant threats to national security 73 In this quest,
legislation and executive orders have been passed which oppress civil liberties
without regard for Constitutional consequences.74 In the present fight against
terrorism, the government should compare the PATRIOT Act against historical
immigration legislation to ensure America's freedoms.75
During World War i, the government curtailed anti-war speech.76 While
entering into World War II, it suspended the Japanese citizens' liberties in the
name of national security 77 In Hirabayash v. U.S., 78 the Supreme Court "upheld

the constitutionality of a curfew imposed only upon Japanese-Americans" living in
or near military areas. 79 A year later, in Korematsu v. U.S., the Court further
undermined the Japanese citizens' civil liberties by upholding the forced relocation
of some Japanese-Americans to internment camps.80 The Court's justification
rested once again on national security and deference to certain military orders as a
wartime necessary evil."1
Following World War 11, America concentrated on its new enemy the
Communists. 8 2 Citizens who were organizing, teaching, or advocating the
overthrow of the United States government were convicted.83 The Supreme Court
upheld these convictions on the ground that free speech is not "unlimited and
unqualified" when it presents a sufficient threat to America. 4
The present day threat to national security is terrorism, and the government
has passed the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 to combat this danger.85 Some critics
have argued that this Act contains provisions that infringe on citizens' civil

in Title IX § 905 of the Act which includes such provision subject to the Attorney General's
establishment of standards and procedures for such sharing; see Shelby, supra note 49, at 59.
73. U.S. CONST., supra note 1.
74. See Dowley, supra note 65, at 174; see also Deborah Kristensen, Finding the Right Balance:

American Civil Liberties in Time of War ADVOC., Dec. 2001 at 20-21.
75. See Dowley, supra note 65, at 174.
76. HUTcHINSON, supra note 15, at 424-425.
77 Executive Order, supra note 28.
78. Hirabayashi v. U.S., 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
79 Dowley, supra note 65, at 175.

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214, 218-219 (1944).
Id. at 220.
McCarran-Walter Act, supra note 31, at 184-185.
See Dennis v. U.S., 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
Id at 503; see also Dowley, supra note 65, at 176.
See USA Patriot Act, supra note 59.
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liberties.86 While the majority of the immigration legislation, from increased
border patrol, to broadening the definition of engaging terrorist activity to
expanding grounds for deportation and admissibility have been relatively
unscathed by controversy, the Act's surveillance provisions have been hotly
criticized. 7 Detractors of the PATRIOT Act argue a violation of the Fourth
Amendment regarding its search and seizure provisions. 88 However, the Supreme
Court ruled in Warden v. Hayden that there are exceptions to the probable cause
and warrant requirements. 89
These exceptions include times of "exigent
circumstances" where following such procedures is impractical and inapposite to
policy 90
Another highly attacked provision of the Act is § 213 which authorizes "sneak
and peek" warrants. 91 This provision allows officials to conduct a search without
informing the suspect until after completion.92 This section further authorizes the
delayed notification of electronic or physical searches if the government can prove
that such notification may jeopardize the investigation.93
Though certain civil liberties may be compromised for the sake of national
security, steps can be taken to ensure that the government's expansive and
intrusive tools are not abused. 94 The foremost solution is to direct courts to
narrowly construe the provisions of the PATRIOT Act, while keeping in mind the
legislative intent and national security concerns.95
Immigration Enforcement Provisions
Title IV of the USA PATRIOT Act is targeted towards protecting the border.
Specifically- subtitle A of § 402 "authorizes a tripling of the number of Border
Patrol personnel, Customs personnel, and immigration inspectors" along the
Northern (Canadian) border.96 It also calls for increased funding for new
technology 97 These technological innovations include granting the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS) and the State Department access to the FBI's

86. Emanuel Gross, The Influence of Terrorist Attacks on Human Rights in the United States: The
Aftermath of September I /, 2001, 28 N.C.J. INTL'L L. & CoM. REG. 1- 2 (2002).
87. Id. (The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) argues that this legislation unnecessarily
sacrifices civil liberties by denying due process).
88. Id. at 8.
89. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967).
90. Id.
91. See USA Patriot Act, supra note 59, at § 213; Dowley, supra note 65, at 181.
92. Dowley, supra note 65, at 181.
93. Id., USA Patriot Act, supra note 59, at § 213.
94. Dowley, supra note 65, at 183.
95. Id. at 182; see also Edward P Ryan, Jr., Anti-Terror Bill Threatens Liberties, MASS. LAW
WKLY. (Nov. 13, 2001) at 25, available at http://www.masslaw.com/ryanvaew.htm.
96. Rosemary Jenks, The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001: A Summary of the Anti-Terrorism Law's
Immigration-Related Provisions, Center for Immigration Studies, 2 (Dec. 2001), at
http://www.cis.orglarticles/200I/backI501.html.
97. Id.
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NCIC files for checking the criminal history of visa applicants."
Additionally, the USA PATRIOT Act broadened the definition of "engage in
terrorist activity" and expanded the categories of non-citizens barred from entry
and increased their susceptibility to deportation for terrorist activities. 99 The
PATRIOT Act defines a terrorist organization as two or more persons engaged in a
terrorist activity 10o It further defines "engage in terrorist activity" to include
involvement in inciting to commit a terrorist activity, "to prepare or plan" any such
activity "to gather information on potential targets, to ask for financial support
for terrorist activities, to commit an act that is materially related to support
terrorists,1° 1 or to use or threaten to use weapons for violence against persons or
property 102 Once a person or group is designated as being involved with terrorist
activities, they are deportable for soliciting people to join it, fundraising for it, or
providing support for it. °3
Prior to the PATRIOT Act, only non-citizens engaging in or supporting
terrorist activities were deportable.1 4 The PATRIOT Act amends that definition to
make them deportable for any connection to a terrorist organization. 105
Section 411 deals with detaining suspected terrorists. i06 The PATRIOT Act
grants the Attorney General the authority to certify aliens as terrorists and detain
them if he has "reasonable grounds to believe" that they are involved in unlawful
terrorist activities.1 7 Detainment periods can now run up to six months if their
removal is unlikely in the near future and their release may threaten national
security or public safety 108 Prior to September 11, aliens who were perceived to
be a threat to national security were placed in removal proceedings and detained as
long as the proceedings lasted 0 9 However, the alien was allowed to present
evidence to the contrary to an immigration judge and seek his release. 110Under the
new, more stringent provisions, INS prosecutors can file an appeal to a release
order and keep the alien detained."' In addition, the INS amended a regulation

98. USA Patriot Act tit. IV § 401-405, supra note 59; see also Memorandum from the
Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service to the Regional Directors and Regional
Counsel 2 (Oct. 31, 2001) (on file with the United States Dept. of Justice, Immigration and
Naturalization Service) [hereinafter Memo], available at http://www.bcis.gov/graphics.
99. Arthur C. Helton & Dessie Zagorcheva, Globalization, Terror, & the Movements of People, 36
INT'L LAW 91, 96 (Spnng 2002); see also Memo, supra note 98, at 2-3; USA Patriot Act, supra note
59, at § 411
100. Cole, supra note 7, at 12.
101. Helton & Zagorcheva, supra note 99, at 96.
102. Cole, supra note 7, at 11-12.
103. Helton & Zagorcheva, supra note 99 at 96.
104. Cole, supra note 7, at 11; see also USA Patriot Act, supra note 59, at § 411.
105. Cole, supra note 7, at 11; see also USA Patriot Act, supra note 59, at § 411 (a)( I )(G).
106. USA Patriot Act, supra note 59, at § 411.
107 Helton & Zagorcheva, supra note 99, at 96.
108. Jenks, supra note 96, at 3.
109 Cole, supra note 7, at 12.
110. Id. at 12-13.
Ill. Id.at 13.
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governing the detention of aliens without formal charges. 1 2 While the prior
regulation required the INS to file charges within twenty-four hours of detainment,
the new regulation extends this detainment period to forty-eight hours, and for an
unspecified "reasonable" period beyond forty-eight hours in times of
emergency 13 This new legislation was passed to protect the country from those
who plan
activities that could "endanger the welfare, safety, or security" of the
114
US.
Summary Effects ofAmendments on Inadmissibilityand Removal Compared to
Prior Legislation
The PATRIOT ACT enhances the government's authority to deport or deny
admission to alien terrorists. 115 Under the prior law, members of terrorist
organizations were denied entry into the United States only if their organization
was designated as one of the twenty-eight terrorist organizations under § 219 of the
INA.' 16
Under the new provisions, any persons or organizations may be
inadmissible if the Secretary of State has determined them to be a political or
social group who publicly endorses terrorist acts which undermines the U.S.'s
efforts to thwart or eliminate terrorism.' 17 Further, previous legislation held
inadmissible only those aliens designated as members of § 219 who "knew or
should have known the organization was a terrorist organization." ' 18 The new laws
expand inadmissibility to members of both § 219 designated organizations and to
"any terrorist organization that the alien knows or should know is a terrorist
organization."' 19
Under prior law aliens who engaged in terrorist activities were deportable and
inadmissible, and legislation limited the term "engaged in terrorist activity" to
soliciting funds or members for a terrorist organization. 120 However, it did not
include a working definition of a terrorist organization. 121 It did not clarify
whether an alien's solicitation of funds or members for a terrorist organization
constituted "engaging in a terrorist activity" if the alien lacked the intent to further
a terrorist activity
and/or did not have knowledge he was involved in a terrorist
22
organization.
The new law amends these deficiencies. First, it defines that a terrorist
organization can be established by- (1) designation by the Secretary of State under

112. Id. atl2.
113. Id.
114. USA Patriot Act, supra note 59, at § 411 (a)(i)(G).
115. Id. at § 411 (b)(2).
116. Memo, supra note 98, at 4. (The Immigration and Naturalization Act § 219 designates certain
organizations that are affiliated with terrorist activities).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 4-5.
119. Id. at 5.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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§ 219" (2) after a finding that the organization (a) commits or threatens to commit a
terrorist activity (b) plans or prepares for terrorist activity, (c) gathers information
on potential targets for terrorist activity, or (d) gathers material support to further
terrorist activities; or (3) by being a group of two or more people that (a) commits
or threatens to commit a terrorist activity (b) plans or prepares for terrorist
activity, (c) gathers information on potential targets for terrorist activity, or (d)
gathers material support to further a terrorist activity 123
Next, the law is broadened to include an alien's solicitation of funds or
members for a terrorist organization, even if not intending to further terrorist
activity and/or not having knowledge of the terrorist organization as constituting
"engaging in a terrorist activity ,124
Third, the law expands the grounds for deportation and inadmissibility Now
the government is not required to prove that an alien had a specific intent to
support a terrorist activity in order to deport him or to declare him inadmissible. 25
Regardless of intent, if an alien is found to have supported a designated or
126
identified terrorist organization, he is inadmissible and/or deportable.
Finally the new laws expand the definition of "engaged in terrorist activity"
and "terrorist organization. 127 This change results in an increase of the classes of
aliens who become ineligible for other forms of relief or protection under the
immigration laws. 28 The effected parties are those seeking an adjustment of
29
status, a release pending deportation, and withholding of removal.1
ADEQUACY OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT

Though the USA PATRIOT Act implements legislation towards protecting
the United States from terrorism, the question remains whether it is adequate to
actually reduce or eliminate the threat. Comparing previous U.S. legislation
following a threat to the culture, freedoms, and political ideologies of this country,
the PATRIOT Act is not sweeping legislation. More aggressive reforms that the
PATRIOT Act did not address should have been considered.
The question raised must be whether this new legislation (the USA PATRIOT
Act) meets the immigration problems of today and adequately represents the
immigration policy that is now necessary

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 6.
Id.
Id.
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Beyond the USA PA TRIOT Act
A recent study conducted by the Center for Immigration Studies reported how
foreign terrorists entered the United States. 13 The research revealed that foreign
terrorists have employed nearly every possible means for admission. For example,
some have come as tourists, students, and business travelers. Others have entered
as legal permanent residents and become naturalized United States citizens, while
others have simply crossed the border illegally or used false documentation. i31
Further immigration enforcement problems were revealed by the fact that
terrorists have illegally crossed the border, used false documentation to enter the
U.S., and those who have entered legally have overstayed without any
consequences by the INS.' 3 2 The INS's failure in fulfilling its duties was clearly
highlighted when they approved visa extensions for two of the September 1 1 h
hijackers six months following their deaths. 133 The attacks also revealed other
deficiencies in the INS system and together these brought about further support for
drastic changes.
The 2000 Census Bureau reported 114,818 illegal Middle Eastern men and
women in the US. 134 The Census also reported that there are approximately 8.7
million illegal immigrants, twice that of 1990. 3 5 Immigration officials, such as
Steven Camorata, are concerned not only with the high number of people who are
residing illegally but "also with the potential terrorist attack that could result from
a lax immigration policy ,,i36 The immigrant population now makes up I1 1% of
the nation's population, an increase of 57% since 1990.137 The INS now conducts
more enforcement operations that result in greater arrests than any other law
enforcement agency in the world; this is done despite an undermanned staff and an
aging computer system. 38 September 1 1Ih brought all of these problems to the
130. Panel Discussion Transcript, How Have Terrorists Enteredthe U.S.? Center for Immigration
Studies 1 (2002), availableat http://www.cis.org/articles/2002/terrorpr.html [hereinafter Panel] (Port of
entry is a technical term where legal admission occurs through inspection).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See Alex Johnson, INS Extends Visas for Sept. 11 Terrorist Pilots, MSNBC, Mar. 12, 2002,
availableat http://www.usbc.org/info/everything2OO2/O302terrorextension.htm.
134. Christopher Marquis, Census Bureau Estimates 115,000 Middle Eastern Immigrants Are in
U.S. Illegally, N.Y TIMES, Jan. 23, 2002, at AI0.
135. See id.
136. Catherine E. Otto, Comment, Tracking Immigrants in the United States: Proposed and
Perceived Needs to Protect the Borders of the UnitedStates, 28 N.C. J. INT' L L. & COM. REG. 477
479 (Winter 2002); see also Chitra Ragavan, Coming to America: An Already Burdened Immigration
System Faces the New Demands of Post 9/11World, US NEWS & WORLD REP Feb. 18, 2002, at
16; see also Bill Gertz, 5,000 in US Suspected of Ties to al Qaeda, WASH. TIMES, July 1I,2002, at
At.
137 Stephen Dinan, Immigration Growth of 1990's at Highest Rate in 150 Years, WASH. TIMES,
June 5, 2002, at A3.
138. Ragavan, supra note 136, at 16 (Yearly estimates are 50,000 criminal investigations, greater
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surface and the federal government
acknowledged that in its current state, the INS
139
could not meet its demands.
Subsequently, the PATRIOT Act concentrated some of its most important
immigration provisions on intelligence sharing which will ultimately enhance the
resources available to the Border Patrol and the Consulate officers to effectively
address these problems.
Border Patrol
One of the major areas identified as a port of entry for foreign terrorists is the
United States' border. 140 Controlling the border is an integral step in countering
terrorism; if terrorists cannot enter the country, they cannot commit an attack. The
Immigration Border Patrol is "the guardian of the frontier[,]" as it provides the first
line of defense against entry 141 The Border Patrol's primary responsibility is to
prevent the surreptitious entry of aliens through land or the coastal boundaries. i42
The Border Patrol is also responsible for preventing the smuggling of aliens into
the United States, and to apprehend those who have immigrated illegally 143
In 2000, the Border Patrol apprehended 1.6 million persons for unauthorized
entry, but a large, undetermined number of aliens eluded the Border Patrol and
entered the country '44 These enormous numbers detail the magnitude of the
problem. One possible solution is to increase the manpower and infrastructure at
the borders. 45 A 2000 report indicated a total of 9,000 agents, and only 1,700
agents on duty on any given shift
at the southern border, which is an average of
46
less than one agent per one mile.i
Another striking example of the U.S.'s lax immigration enforcement
concerned the U.S.-Canadian border. Many terrorist cells operating in the U.S.
have bases in Canada. 147 Prior to September 1 1 th Millennium bomber Ahmed
Ressam was arrested as he tried to cross the U.S.-Canadian border with ingredients
for a homemade bomb to attack Los Angeles International Airport. 48 This arrest
sparked discussion about possible solutions to the unguarded border, but no
than 1,000 arrests, 300,000 court cases, and

175, 000 deportation hearings resulting in 1,200
deportations weekly).
139. Otto, supra note 136, at 485.
140. Panel, supra note 130.
141. Maro T Noto, Travel & Domestic Control, 367 ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF
POLITICAL & SOCIAL SCIENCES (Sept. 1996).

142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Martin & Martin, supra note 36, at 4.
145. Mark Krikorian & Steven A. Camarota, Immigration and Terrorism: What Is To Be Done?

Centerfor ImmigrationStudies, 7 (Nov. 2001 ), at http://www.cis.org/articles/200I/back 160 i.html.
146. Steven A. Camarota, Immigration and Terrorism: Testimony Preparedfor U.S. Senate
Committee on the Judiciary,9 (Oct. 2001), at http:www//cis.org/articles/2001/sactestimony1001.html.
147. See Scripps Howard News Service, Porous Border a Terror Concern, CINCINNATI POST,

Sept. 29, 2001, available at: http://www.cincypost.con/2001/sep/29/border092901 .html.
148. Jonathan Dube, et.al., Massive Manhunt Under Way, ABC NEWS, available at:
http://www.abcnews.go.com/sections/us/DailyNews/canada99 1220.html.
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decisive action was implemented. 149 After September 1 Ithinvestigators reported
that as many as five of the nineteen terrorists slipped across the Canadian border,
including the cell's ringleader, Mohammad Atta.' 50 September 11th sparked further
inquiry into the border problems, revealing staggering statistics. There are an
estimated 3 million foreigners who overstayed their visas, but there is a lack of
personnel to adequately patrol the border and track down these persons.i' This
prompted Congress and the President to take a closer look at how to secure the
border, which is addressed by the PATRIOT Act.
A straightforward solution to this problem would be to increase the number of
patrolling agents and inspection points. 152 The PATRIOT Act addresses this
concern by authorizing the tripling of Border Patrol Agents. 53 However, this
increase in the number of agents is only the first step. The Act should have gone
into further detail outlining improved training guidelines and timelines for
implementation.
In attempting to implement the increase in Border Personnel, the PATRIOT
Act led to the enactment of the Border Security Act of 2002, 54 effectively giving
"teeth" to the PATRIOT Act's provisions. Primary benefits of the Act are on the
Border Patrol, visa issuance, and foreign student and exchange programs.
First, there is an appropriation of $150 million to the INS and Customs
Service towards implementing an interagency electronic database, machinereadable visas with biometric identifiers, and a computer system for monitoring
foreign students.iSS Currently there are three technological endeavors: (1) the
Enterprise Architecture, (2) the Student Exchange Architecture Information
System (SEVIS), and (3) the Data Management Improvement of 2000. 56 The
integration of these databases will provide federal law enforcement and
intelligence agencies with relevant information to deportation proceedings and visa
issues. 157 This will directly aid the increased Border Patrol agents and all other law
enforcement and intelligence personnel to identify and investigate suspected

149. Dean Patton, Along U.S. Border, Problems Rise, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Sept.
22, 2000, availableat: http://www.search.csmontor.com/durable/2000/09/22/p3sl.htm.

150. See Scripps Howard News Service, supra note 147.
151. Cheryl N. Thompson, Reorganization,Anti-Terrorism Effort Keeping INS Chief Busy, WASH.
POST, Jan. 21, 2002, at A15.
152. Krikortan & Camarota, supra note 145, at 7.
153. See USA Patriot Act, supra note 59 at § 402.
154. See Border Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-173, 102, 116 Stat. 543, 546 (2002)
(codified as amended at8 U.S.C.A. 1712).
155. Id.
156. See Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (formerly US Dept. of Justice Immig. &
Nat. Service), Oct. 2002, at 8, available at http://www.bcis.gov. (The Enterprise Architecture was
mandated in 2000 and it is "the long-term, strategically oriented approach to accomplishing the
information driven aspects of the INS mission. The SEVIS provides information on student visas.
The Data Management Improvement Act was enacted to develop an integrated, automated entry-exit
data collection system. Further, the immigration inspectors' now have access to the National Crime
Information Center (NCIC) to identify criminal aliens prior to their arrival).
157 Otto, supra note 136, at 499.
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terrorists. 158
US Consulate and Visa Issues
Consular Affairs
All of the September I 1th 2001 hijackers presented apparently valid travel
documentation at U.S. ports of entry 159 Therefore, it is imperative to have closer
scrutiny of who is granted access to enter the country (in terms of visa issuance to
foreigners abroad, and inspection of foreign nationals at U.S. ports of entry).i 60
Inspection controls function to protect the national interest. 161 It involves the
examination of persons seeking entrance into the United States from foreign
territories through ports of entry 162 The United State's inspection policies are to
screen out undesirable aliens who may63be involved in criminal or subversive
activities or other objectionable conduct.1
Entry into the United States is a privilege and not a right, and is granted at the
discretion of the members of the Consular Affairs.i64 Currently the Consular
Affairs lack the manpower and tools to meet the tremendous load of applications.
In 2000, almost 10 million foreigners applied for visas, for which there were only
some 1100 consular officers, many young professionals just beginning their
foreign services careers. 65 This results in consulate officers having very limited
time to review each application. 66 In a recent panel discussion on immigration
and terrorism, a former foreign services agent stated that approximately only onefifth of all non-immigrant visa applicants are interviewed. To further exacerbate
the problem, the State Department is moving towards "drop boxes, group
applications via travel agencies and other ways to avoid having to actually look at
people who are asking for permission to enter."' 167 Adding to this challenge is the
defective evaluation system whereby visa officers are assessed by the number of
interviews they conduct daily 168
One solution is to implement a biometric identification system. The initial
need to include biometric identifiers in border security enforcement was realized as
a result of the September IIth attacks, and a further push was spurred by the
confusion in identifying Richard Reid, a Briton attempting to smuggle a shoe-

158. Mark Bixier, War on Terrorism: Tracking Foreign Students Gains Renewed Interest
Stalled Projectin Atlanta Being Developed by INS, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Jan. 7, 2002, at A5.
159. Martin & Martin, supra note 36, at I.
160. Id. at 3.
161. Noto, supra note 141,at 78.
162. Id.

163.
164.
165.
166.
167
168.

Id.
Martin & Martin, supra note 36, at 2.
Id.
Id. at 2-3.
Panel, supra note 130, at 4.
Camarota, supra note 146.

Once

2003

IMMIGRATION LEGISLATION &

US NATIONAL

SECURITY

169
bomb onto an airplane destined for Miami.

The first biometric identification system, named "IDENT was piloted in
It contained a database with thousands of criminal
1995 in California. 170
records.171 By 1996, IDENT was implemented at thirty-four sites along the U.S.
Mexican border. 7 2 The results were astounding; within the first few months over
73
3,000 criminal aliens who were attempting entry into the U.S. were identified.
Implementing a system similar to IDENT (one which compares the individual
features of a visa applicant to those who actually appear at ports of entry by using
unique technologies such as fingerprinting, retinal scans, or hand geometry 74)
could have a significant effect on stopping terrorists at U.S. borders. The Border
on all visas and passports that
Security Act of 2002 requires biometric identifiers
75
American consulates issue to foreign travelers.
Such a system would create an electronic file on each issued visa applicant
that would be available to inspectors at the U.S. ports of entry prior to an alien's
arrival. This information and technology can then be employed by the INS to
develop and implement an entry/exit system to track aliens as they enter and exit
the country
Entry/Exit System
However, even with increased officers, the right tools are needed to keep the
terrorists out. The Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS) currently is
the primary tool in flagging terrorists. 176 CLASS is a "watch list" of suspicious
people who should be inadmissible. 177 However, this system is flawed since it is
based solely on names and not on a "biometric identifier" such as a fingerprint,
resulting in terrorists sneaking into the country 178
The PARTIOT Act addresses this issue by requiring the Department of
Justice and FBI to provide the INS and the State Department information from its
National Crime Information Center (NCIC). The Act also included a provision to
assess the possibility of enhancing the FBI's Integrated Automated Fingerprint

169. See Jonathan Peterson, Digital Images Will Verify Identity of Visitors to US, L.A. TIMES, Jan.

2, 2002. (Reid attempted to smuggle a bomb onto a Miami-bound airplane).
170. See BUREAU OF CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVICES, Inspector General Report
on Resendez-RamirezIlNDENT Mar. 20, 2000, available at: http://www.immigration.gov/graphics/

publicaffairs/statements/igstate.htm.
171. Id.
172. Bryan Paul Chnstian, Visa Policy, Inspection and Exit Controls: Transatlantic Perspectives
on Migration Management, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 215, 220 (1999).

173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-173, §
303(b)(I), 116 Stat. 543, 553 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.S. 1732); see also Otto, supra note 136,
at 501-02.
176. Krikorian & Camarota, supra note 145, at 3.
177. Id.
178. Id.
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Identification System. 179 This is a promising start, but to be effective, the process
should begin with the visa applicant's fingerprints being digitally scanned into an
integrated system which all other agencies have access. 180 There should be a
single file for each applicant that is checked against all "watch lists, and that file
should stay with them until they leave, when their fingerprints should be once
again scanned. 18 1 This would create an entry/exit system which would provide
adequate checks on when a person entered the country, exited the country, and
when they were supposed to leave. It would also serve other purposes: such as
providing an effective way of excluding aliens on the "watch list" it would
solidify the identification system, ensuring that the person who entered the country
was the same one issued the visa; it would further prevent fraud by making it
nearly impossible for a person to go from consulate to consulate using different
identities; and it would deter would be terrorists who would be reluctant to give
their fingerprints. 182
This entry/exit system could also be implemented for tracking foreigners in
the United States on student visas. In 2000, about 284,000 foreigners received
student visas. 8 3 The major concerns for consulate officers in determining whether
to issue a visa is the foreigner's financial status (whether the foreigner has
sufficient funds to live and study in the U.S.) and their likelihood of returning to
their native country. 8 4 Prior to September I th 2001, legislation had been passed
but not enforced regarding the tracking of foreign students.185 Universities were
supposed to cooperate with the State Department and the INS with details of a
foreign student's activities (such as registration of classes, attendance, grades,
i86
etc.); however few schools complied and most blocked its implementation.
Foreign Student and Exchange Visitors
The need for improvement in the INS's tracking ability of foreign students
became apparent post September IIth when evidence revealed that two of the
hijackers were living in the U.S. on student visas. One of the terrorists, Ham
Hamjour, had apparently entered the U.S. on an F-I student visa in December
2000.187 He however never attended school, nor did the school notify the INS of
his absence. 88 The other hijacker, Mommad Atta, who was believed to be the
leader, was granted permission to switch his visa status to that of a student because
he was taking flying lessons. 8 9 These examples illustrate the necessity for
179. USA Patriot Act, Pub. supranote 59, at §§ 403, 405, 15 Stat. 272, 343 (2001).
180. Krikorian & Camarota, supranote 145, at 12.
181. Id.
182. Id at4.
183. Martin & Martin, supra note 36 at 5.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187 Federation for American Immigration Reform, Issue Brief: World Trade Center and Pentagon
Terrorists' Identity and Immigration Status, available at: http://www.fairus.org/htmi/04178i01 .htm.
188. See Ragavan, supra note 136.
189. See id.
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tracking foreigners on student visas. Another problem was the lack of cooperation
from schools to provide and report information of these students to the appropriate
authorities.19° Post September 11 th has shown a strong willingness from these
institutions to comply with the reporting requirements. However, even with school
reports of a student's absence, the INS previously did not have a system in place to
effectively track these missing students.1 9'
Following September I1h (since it was found that some of the terrorists
entered the U.S. on student visas), the Student and Exchange Visitor Program
tracking system is expected to be fully functional with the cooperation of all
universities. 1 2 A further, but more extreme approach could be to revive the 1940
Alien Registration Act, requiring all non-citizens living in the U.S. to annually
register their residential address with the State Department and INS.' 93 Such a
policy could be easily implemented if the foreigner's fingerprints and other
relevant information are already in an automated, integrated file, where they could
be tracked. These methods of an entry/exit system, fingerprinting, and the
registration requirements could serve as a deterrence for future terrorists from
another route of entry into U.S., and would help in the identification and
monitoring of current foreigners who may be suspected of terrorist activities.
Since the enactment of the PATRIOT Act, the INS has recently admitted that
it still does not know the number of foreign students who have overstayed their
visas, nor have they been successful in tracking these over-stayers.' 94
Additionally, of the 547,000 student visas in the U.S., officials report that they do
not know if these people are actually attending school.' 95
These alarming statistics provide further support for the need to implement
the biometric identifiers with alacrity One criticism of the biometric identification
system is the fear that it will lead to a national identification (ID) cards that may
impinge on privacy rights.196 There have been scattered reactions on this issue,
and further research must be conducted through detailed surveys with legal experts
to determine its legality and its potential effects on U.S. citizens. Until then, the
government stands by its position that the "U.S. must make every effort to reduce
the possibility of terrorist attacks in the future[,] ' 'i 97 and implementing a biometric
identification system is a critical step in revamping the immigration system to
achieve this result.
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Id.
Id.
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TargetingSpecific Countries
A review of U.S. immigration policy demonstrates evidence of racial
Clearly Immigration and
discrimination in certain times of U.S. history
Naturalization has been unfairly denied to members of certain ethnic groups.' 98
The Chinese Exclusion Act barred Chinese peoples from 1882 until the Act
was repealed in 1943.'99 Similarly, the Asiatic Barred Zone clause of the 1917 Act
excluded southeastern Asians except the Japanese. 200 The Japanese suffered from
a limited immigration policy since the 1907 Gentleman's Agreement. 20 1 These
were explicit legislative acts, but legislative history also shows exclusion of certain
immigrant groups without formal legislation, as was evidenced during World War
I and World War II against the Germans, Communists, and the Japanese.20 2
If one were to apply precedent to the current problem of terrorism, there is a
strong argument for more thorough screening for applicants from certain countries,
and an extreme argument to exclude all enemies of the United States. The USA
PATRIOT ACT now grants the INS the authority to "prohibit[] the admission of
an alien from a country designated to be a state sponsor of international terrorism
(as defined by [the PATRIOT] Act) unless the Secretary of State has determined
20°3
that such individual does not pose a risk or security threat to the U.S.
However, it does not extend this restriction to those countries that are not
designated as state sponsors of terrorism; it only provides legislation to deny entry
to individuals from any state that may be associated with terrorism. 20 4 Further
steps should be taken to safeguard against the entry of terrorists on U.S. soil.
IncreasedScreening
The PATRIOT Act is not the first attempt to combat terrorism. In 1996, the
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) was passed. 20 5 The
AEDPA resulted in the increased screening of certain groups suspected of
terrorism. 0 6 The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) granted officers broad
power to interrogate suspected aliens as to their right to remain in the U.S.2°7 The
198. See Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 214 (1882), 47th Cong; Immigration Act of Feb.
5, 1917, ch. 29, Pub. L. No. 301, 39 Stat. 874; Alan M. Kraut, Records of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, Nov. 1995, available at: http://www.lexisnexis.com/academic/guides
/immigrationlins/insal .asp.
199. See Chinese Exclusion Act, supra note 198.
200. See Immigration Act, supra note 198.
201. See Kraut, supra note 198.
202. Regarding the Palmer Raids, Japanese internment camps, and the stifling of speech of any
anti-American sentiment.
203. Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-73, § 306,
116 Stat. 543 (2002) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.A. 1735).
204. See Memo, supra note 98, at 4-5.
205. Adrienne R. Bellino, Changing Immigration for Arabs With Anti-Terrorism Legislation:
September I1th Was Not the Catalyst, 16 TEMP INT'L & COMp L. J. 123-24 (Spring 2002).
206. Id.
207. Id.at 129.
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USA PATRIOT Act perpetuates this by granting visa officers, the Attorney
General, and other INS agents broad power to check suspected alien terrorist.
However, visa officers should be granted more responsibility and power as
they are the first step in keeping alien terrorists out of the U.S. They should be
empowered to deny admission to people who are enemies of America, but have not
yet engaged in terrorist activities. 20 8 There are citizens from countries whose
government do not sponsor terrorism, yet who have come here and engaged in
terrorist activities. 2 09 Applicants from such countries should be subject to much
stricter screening, including an exhaustive security clearance.210 In addition, visa
issuance should be restricted to U.S. consulates in their home country not
consulates outside of their home state.2 1 1 There is nothing unprecedented about
these actions of country specific temporary visa policies.212 Despite some
objections to this proposal, it is important to remember that immigration into the
United States is a privilege and not a right, subject to the provisions prescribed by
the country
CONCLUSION

The surveillance and information sharing provisions of the PATRIOT Act
provide a strong base to rectify the current problems of the system. However, the
immigration enforcement legislation lacks sufficient mandates to adequately
combat the threat of terrorism. To effectively reform immigration policy, changes
have to be flexible and broadly based with regards to a wide range of
considerations on both the national and international fronts, and in harmony with
other elements of national policy The current national threat of terrorism must be
dealt with immigration reform that significantly enhances national security
Though the reforms implemented during World War I, World War II, and against
the Communists (from internment, to registration, to stifling free speech) are
outdated, extreme, and egregious more aggressive measures (through increased
information gathering and sharing and implementing a biometric identification
system) may need to be considered to effectively combat terrorism.
One concern about the implementation of these modifications is their
potential effect on intelligence gathering. While legislative acts that expand the
government's ability to conduct surveillance from roving wiretaps to internet
communications, to expanding the immigration enforcement capabilities through
increased screening and biometric identification, may lead to short-term success in
capturing terrorists, they may have negative effects in the long-term. Some experts
believe that intelligence gathering is based on the "penetration of trust" between

208. Krikorian & Camarota, supra note 145, at 4.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. (This is because an American visa officer stationed in a particular country is more familiar
to identify and deal with problems concerning an applicant from that area than are other officers
stationed elsewhere).
212. Camarota, supra note 146.
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parties, and these provisions may lead to distrust, ultimately making penetration of
future attacks extremely difficult. 21 3

The standard seems to be based on a

reasonable person argument, where it is logical that those who we need
information from will not be willing to cooperate if they are the same people we
are targeting. This raises the issue of proportionality and the government must
determine how stringently these provisions should be administered. There must be
a balance achieved between alleviating the current fear and threat of terrorism and
sustaining covert relations to prevent future attacks.
While it may be too soon to reach definitive conclusions as to the
effectiveness of the PATRIOT Act, preliminary results show improvement in the
immigration system as a whole. The intelligence gathering and sharing provisions
have led to the capture of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, believed to be one of the top
five leaders of al-Qaeda. Mohammed was captured in Pakistan, and has been
identified as the "mastermind" behind the September I Ith attacks. 2114 He has also
been linked to terrorist plots in Europe and Asia. In addition, over 400 a]-Qaeda
members have been detained worldwide, including an al-Qaeda field operations
commander and the head of a hijacker's cell in Germany 215
It is hopeful that similar results will be seen with the implementation of the
enhanced law enforcement provisions (the increase in Border Patrol personnel, the
implementation of the biometric identification system, and the entry/exit system),
but not at the expense of future intelligence gathering. With the changes in the
INS's function and its move into the Department of Homeland Security,
quantifiable results may not be seen for a few years, but the changes in place seem
to be a step in the right direction. As long as the fight against terrorism remains a
top priority, Congress is likely to legislate and implement the necessary resources
to achieve its goal of eliminating terrorism and protecting the American people.
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